Conclusion and Outlook

  • Julian L. Garritzmann
Chapter
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Abstract

This chapter summarizes the book’s main findings. It shows that the empirical chapters, combining several qualitative and quantitative analyses in a multi-method design, offer strong support for the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory: the partisan composition of government, particularly the sequence and duration of different parties in office, explains the historical origins and recent sustainability of the Four Worlds of Student Finance. Moreover, this chapter argues that the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory not only applies to higher education policies, but could also explain policy-making processes in other policy fields, thereby contributing to the comparative politics literature more generally. In short, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory explains the political economy of higher education tuition fees and subsidies well—but could potentially also be applied to other policy domains.

Keywords

Liberal Democratic Party High Education Policy Historical Origin Education Spending Student Finance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Julian L. Garritzmann
    • 1
  1. 1.University of KonstanzDepartment of Politics & Public AdministrationKonstanzGermany

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