Generic Construction of Audit Logging Schemes with Forward Privacy and Authenticity

  • Shoichi HiroseEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9543)


In this paper, audit logging schemes with forward privacy and authenticity are formalized in the symmetric-key setting. Then, two generic audit logging schemes with forward privacy and authenticity are proposed. One consists of an authenticated encryption scheme with associated data. The other consists of a symmetric encryption scheme and a MAC function. Both of them also uses a forward-secure pseudorandom generator to achieve forward security. Finally, the forward privacy and authenticity of the schemes are confirmed in the manner of provable security. The security properties of the proposed schemes are reduced to the standard security properties of the underlying primitives.


Audit logging Forward security Privacy Authenticity 



The author would like to thank Hidenori Kuwakado for valuable discussions. This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25330150.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of EngineeringUniversity of FukuiFukuiJapan

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