On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests
In this paper we study a rent-seeking contest where several groups compete for a prize which is a public good among players in a group. In the contest players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.
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