On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests

  • Takeshi YamazakiEmail author
Part of the Springer Series in Game Theory book series (SSGT)


In this paper we study a rent-seeking contest where several groups compete for a prize which is a public good among players in a group. In the contest players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.


Nash Equilibrium Public Good Production Function Total Expenditure Share Function 
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This research was in part supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research) Numbers 19530151 and 24530194. A paper closely related with this paper was presented at PET15 (the 14th annual conference of the association for public economic theory) held in Luxembourg, 2015. I would like to thank an anonymous referee of this Festschrift and the participants in PET15 for many helpful comments and suggestions. Of course only I am responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsNiigata UniversityNiigata-shiJapan

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