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Foundations of Reconfigurable PUFs

  • Jonas SchneiderEmail author
  • Dominique Schröder
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9092)

Abstract

A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) can be seen as a source of randomness that can be challenged with a stimulus and responds in a way that is to some extent unpredictable. PUFs can be used to provide efficient solutions for common cryptographic primitives such as identification/authentication schemes, key storage, and hardware-entangled cryptography. Moreover, Brzuska et al. have recently shown, that PUFs can be used to construct UC secure protocols (CRYPTO 2011). Most PUF instantiations, however, only provide a static challenge/response space which limits their usefulness for practical instantiations. To overcome this limitation, Katzenbeisser et al. (CHES 2011) introduced Logically Reconfigurable PUFs (LR-PUFs), with the idea to introduce an “update” mechanism that changes the challenge/response behaviour without physically replacing or modifying the hardware.

In this work, we revisit LR-PUFs. We propose several new ways to characterize the unpredictability of LR-PUFs covering a broader class of realistic attacks and examine their relationship to each other. In addition, we reconcile existing constructions with these new characterizations and show that they can withstand stronger adversaries than originally shown. Since previous constructions are insecure with respect to our strongest unpredictability notion, we propose a secure construction which relies on the same assumptions and is almost as efficient as previous solutions.

Keywords

Physically unclonable functions Logically reconfigurable Tamper-resistance 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Dominique Schröder was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) through funding for the Center for IT-Security, Privacy and Accountability (CISPA www.cispa-security.org) and also by an Intel Early Career Faculty Honor Program Award. Finally, we thank the reviewers for their valuable comments.

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany

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