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Fast and Frugal Heuristics at Research Frontiers

  • Thomas Nickles
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 25)

Abstract

How should we model scientific decision-making at the frontiers of research? This chapter explores the applicability of Gerd Gigerenzer’s “fast and frugal” heuristics to frontier contexts, i.e., to so-called context of discovery. Such heuristics require only one or a very few steps to a decision and only a little information. While the approach is somewhat promising, given the limited resources in frontier contexts, trying to extend it to fairly “wild” frontiers raises challenging questions. This chapter attempts to frame the issues (rather than to provide resolutions to them), and thereby to cast light on frontier contexts, which have been misunderstood by philosophers, the general public, and funding agencies alike.

Keywords

Context of discovery Decision under uncertainty Fast and frugal heuristics Frontier research Gigerenzer 

Notes

Acknowledgement

Thanks to Emiliano Ippoliti for organizing this stimulating conference, and thanks to him and to Fabio Sterpetti for their infinite patience and for work on the volume. Thanks also to Markus Kemmelmeier for a helpful comment.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of NevadaRenoUSA

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