International Conference in Cryptology in India

Progress in Cryptology -- INDOCRYPT 2015 pp 105-123 | Cite as

Cryptanalysis of Variants of RSA with Multiple Small Secret Exponents

  • Liqiang Peng
  • Lei Hu
  • Yao Lu
  • Santanu Sarkar
  • Jun Xu
  • Zhangjie Huang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9462)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security of two variants of the RSA public key cryptosystem where multiple encryption and decryption exponents are used with a common modulus. For the most well known variant, CRT-RSA, assume that n encryption and decryption exponents \((e_l,d_{p_l},d_{q_l})\), where \(l=1,\cdots ,n\), are used with a common CRT-RSA modulus N. By utilizing a Minkowski sum based lattice construction and combining several modular equations which share a common variable, we prove that one can factor N when \(d_{p_l},d_{q_l}<N^{\frac{2n-3}{8n+2}}\) for all \(l=1,\cdots ,n\). We further improve this bound to \(d_{p_l}(\mathrm {or}\,d_{q_l})<N^{\frac{9n-14}{24n+8}}\) for all \(l=1,\cdots ,n\). Moreover, our experiments do better than previous works by Jochemsz-May (Crypto 2007) and Herrmann-May (PKC 2010) when multiple exponents are used. For Takagi’s variant of RSA, assume that n key pairs \((e_l,d_l)\) for \(l=1,\cdots ,n\) are available for a common modulus \(N=p^rq\) where \(r\ge 2\). By solving several simultaneous modular univariate linear equations, we show that when \(d_l<N^{(\frac{r-1}{r+1})^{\frac{n+1}{n}}}\), for all \(l=1,\cdots ,n\), one can factor the common modulus N.

Keywords

RSA Cryptanalysis Lattice Coppersmith’s method 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liqiang Peng
    • 1
    • 2
  • Lei Hu
    • 1
    • 2
  • Yao Lu
    • 1
    • 3
  • Santanu Sarkar
    • 4
  • Jun Xu
    • 1
    • 2
  • Zhangjie Huang
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.Data Assurance and Communication Security Research CenterChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  3. 3.The University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  4. 4.Indian Institute of Technology MadrasChennaiIndia

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