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(De-)Constructing TLS 1.3

  • Markulf Kohlweiss
  • Ueli Maurer
  • Cristina Onete
  • Björn Tackmann
  • Daniele Venturi
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9462)

Abstract

SSL/TLS is one of the most widely deployed cryptographic protocols on the Internet. It is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data in various client-server applications. The currently specified version is TLS 1.2, and its security has been analyzed extensively in the cryptographic literature. The IETF working group is actively developing a new version, TLS 1.3, which is designed to address several flaws inherent to previous versions.

In this paper, we analyze the security of a slightly modified version of the current TLS 1.3 draft. (We do not encrypt the server’s certificate.) Our security analysis is performed in the constructive cryptography framework. This ensures that the resulting security guarantees are composable and can readily be used in subsequent protocol steps, such as password-based user authentication over a TLS-based communication channel in which only the server is authenticated. Most steps of our proof hold in the standard model, with the sole exception that the key derivation function HKDF is used in a way that has a proof only in the random-oracle model. Beyond the technical results on TLS 1.3, this work also exemplifies a novel approach towards proving the security of complex protocols by a modular, step-by-step decomposition, in which smaller sub-steps are proved in isolation and then the security of the protocol follows by the composition theorem.

Keywords

Secure Channel Cryptographic Protocol Honest Party Composition Theorem Collision Resistance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Ueli Maurer was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF), project no. 200020-132794. Björn Tackmann was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) via Fellowship no. P2EZP2_155566 and the NSF grants CNS-1228890 and CNS-1116800. Daniele Venturi acknowledges support by the European Commission (Directorate General Home Affairs) under the GAINS project HOME/2013/CIPS/AG/4000005057, and by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 644666.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markulf Kohlweiss
    • 1
  • Ueli Maurer
    • 2
  • Cristina Onete
    • 3
  • Björn Tackmann
    • 4
  • Daniele Venturi
    • 5
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUK
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceETH ZürichZurichSwitzerland
  3. 3.INSA/IRISARennesFrance
  4. 4.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringUC San DiegoSan DiegoUSA
  5. 5.Sapienza University of RomeRomeItaly

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