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Privacy is Not an Option: Attacking the IPv6 Privacy Extension

  • Johanna UllrichEmail author
  • Edgar Weippl
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9404)

Abstract

The IPv6 privacy extension introduces temporary addresses to protect against address-based correlation, i.e., the attribution of different transactions to the same origin using addresses, and is considered as state-of-the-art mechanism for privacy protection in IPv6. In this paper, we scrutinize the extension’s capability for protection by analyzing its algorithm for temporary address generation in detail. We develop an attack that is based on two insights and shows that the notion of protection is false: First, randomization is scarce and future identifiers can be predicted once the algorithm’s internal state is known. Second, a victim’s temporary addresses form a side channel and allow an adversary to synchronize to this internal state. Finally, we highlight mitigation strategies, and recommend a revision of the extension’s specification.

Keywords

Mobile Node Medium Access Control Hash Function Coffee Shop Attack Scenario 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Peter Wurzinger, Dimitris E. Simos, Georg Merzdovnik and Adrian Dabrowski for many fruitful discussions. This research was funded by P 842485 and COMET K1, both FFG - Austrian Research Promotion Agency.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SBA ResearchViennaAustria

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