From Requirements Engineering to Safety Assurance: Refinement Approach

  • Linas LaibinisEmail author
  • Elena Troubitsyna
  • Yuliya Prokhorova
  • Alexei Iliasov
  • Alexander Romanovsky
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9409)


Formal modelling and verification are widely used in the development of safety-critical systems. They aim at providing a mathematically-grounded argument about system safety. In particular, this argument can facilitate construction of a safety case – a structured safety assurance document required for certification of safety-critical systems. However, currently there is no adequate support for using the artefacts created during formal modelling in safety case development. In this paper, we present an approach and the corresponding tool support that tackles this problem in the Event-B modelling framework. Our approach establishes a link between safety requirements, Event-B models and corresponding fragments of a safety case. The supporting automated tool ensures traceability between requirements, models and safety cases.


Safety Requirement Requirement Engineer Proof Obligation Tool Chain Tuple Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Linas Laibinis
    • 1
    Email author
  • Elena Troubitsyna
    • 1
  • Yuliya Prokhorova
    • 2
  • Alexei Iliasov
    • 3
  • Alexander Romanovsky
    • 3
  1. 1.Åbo Akademi UniversityTurkuFinland
  2. 2.Space Systems FinlandEspooFinland
  3. 3.Newcastle UniversityNewcastle Upon TyneUK

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