Hoare Logic for Disjunctive Information Flow

Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9465)

Abstract

Information flow control extends access control by not only regulating who is allowed to access what data but also the subsequent use of the data accessed. Applications within communication networks require such information flow control to depend on the actual data. For a concurrent language with synchronous communication and separate data domains we develop a Hoare logic for enforcing disjunctive information flow policies. We establish the soundness of the Hoare logic with respect to an operational semantics and illustrate the development on a running example.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hanne Riis Nielson
    • 1
  • Flemming Nielson
    • 1
  • Ximeng Li
    • 1
  1. 1.DTU ComputeTechnical University of DenmarkKongens LyngbyDenmark

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