Symbolic Protocol Analysis with Disequality Constraints Modulo Equational Theories

  • Santiago Escobar
  • Catherine Meadows
  • José Meseguer
  • Sonia Santiago
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9465)

Abstract

Research in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has produced much good work in the solving of equality constraints, developing new methods for unification, matching, and deducibility. However, considerably less attention has been paid to disequality constraints. These also arise quite naturally in cryptographic protocol analysis, in particular for analysis of indistinguishability properties. Thus methods for deciding whether or not they are satisfiable could potentially be quite useful in reducing the size of the search space by protocol analysis tools. In this paper we develop a framework for reasoning about disequality constraints centered around the paradigm of the most discriminating Dolev-Yao attacker, who is able to detect a disequality if it is satisfied in some implementation of the crypto-algebra satisfying given equality properties. We develop several strategies for handling disequalities, prove their soundness and completeness, and demonstrate the result of experimental analyses using the various strategies. Finally, we discuss how disequality checking algorithms could be incorporated within symbolic reachability protocol analysis methods.

Keywords

Equational Theory Cryptographic Protocol Attack State Reachability Analysis Attack Pattern 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work has been partially supported by NSF grant CNS 13-19109, by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grant TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and by Spanish Generalitat Valenciana under grant PROMETEOII/2015/013.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland (outside the US) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Santiago Escobar
    • 1
  • Catherine Meadows
    • 2
  • José Meseguer
    • 3
  • Sonia Santiago
    • 3
  1. 1.DSIC-ELPUniversitat Politècnica de ValènciaValenciaSpain
  2. 2.Naval Research LaboratoryWashington, D.C.USA
  3. 3.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignChampaignUSA

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