Games with Communication: From Belief to Preference Change
In this work we consider simple extensive-form games with two players, Player A and Player B, where Player B can make announcements about his strategy. Player A has then to revise her preferences about her strategies, so as to better respond to the strategy she believes Player B will play. We propose a generic framework that combines methods and techniques from belief revision theory and social choice theory to address this problem. Additionally, we design a logic that Player A can use to reason and decide how to play in such games.
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