Norm Establishment in a Single Dimension Axelrod Model

  • Vinay Katiyar
  • David Clarance
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9387)


In Axelrod norm models (Axelrod, 1986), the existence of a norm is described in terms of two variables, namely Boldness and Vengefulness. This tradition operates on the assumption that these two variables are independent. In this paper we seek to investigate behavior when this assumption is violated. In particular, we postulate a linear negative relationship between the two. We find that in such a world, norm establishment is possible without a Metanorm. Further we prove that this state is an Evolutionary Stable State (ESS). Finally, we explore the role of initial states in bringing about varied behavior in the presence of multiple ESSs.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tata Research Development & Design CentrePuneIndia

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