Meta-philosophical Preliminaries

  • Marie I. Kaiser
Part of the History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences book series (HPTL)


Chapter 2 serves to disclose the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie my analysis of explanatory reduction. This includes explicating (and justifying) the aim of my analysis, the philosophical methodology by which I develop my account, and the criteria of adequacy that I accept. I will characterize my own account as being descriptive and bottom-up but critical, as being as universal as possible and as specific as necessary, as being normative in a certain way but not in another, and as being potentially useful for science.


Philosophical methodology Descriptive adequacy Normativity Biological practice 


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marie I. Kaiser
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität zu KölnKölnGermany

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