Cultural Traits in Economic Theory

  • Fabrizio PanebiancoEmail author


This contribution introduces the strong relationships between the economic theory and the concept of cultural traits. Even if cultural traits have been only recently introduced in a formal way in the economic modelization, I show how the very basic elements of economic theory (preferences, social norms, and strategies) can be fully considered as cultural traits. I show, then, how economists face the problem of the transmission and diffusion of these traits. To do this, I analyze the frameworks from evolutionary game theory, the economics of cultural transmission and network theory. Each of them provides useful insights to explain the diffusion of traits and the emergence of cultural homogeneity or diversity. Ongoing research now aims at providing an unified economic framework to model these cultural dynamics.


Cultural transmission Cultural diffusion Economics Network economics 



The author is greatful to ERC project TECTACOM - 324004 for financial support


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Paris School of EconomicsParisFrance

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