European Symposium on Research in Computer Security

Computer Security -- ESORICS 2015 pp 230-251 | Cite as

Checking Trace Equivalence: How to Get Rid of Nonces?

  • Rémy Chrétien
  • Véronique Cortier
  • Stéphanie Delaune
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9327)

Abstract

Security protocols can be successfully analysed using formal methods. When proving security in symbolic settings for an unbounded number of sessions, a typical technique consists in abstracting away fresh nonces and keys by a bounded set of constants. While this abstraction is clearly sound in the context of secrecy properties (for protocols without else branches), this is no longer the case for equivalence properties.

In this paper, we study how to soundly get rid of nonces in the context of equivalence properties. We show that nonces can be replaced by constants provided that each nonce is associated to two constants (instead of typically one constant for secrecy properties). Our result holds for deterministic (simple) protocols and a large class of primitives that includes e.g. standard primitives, blind signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rémy Chrétien
    • 1
    • 2
  • Véronique Cortier
    • 1
  • Stéphanie Delaune
    • 2
  1. 1.LORIAINRIA Nancy - Grand-EstVillers-lès-NancyFrance
  2. 2.LSVENS Cachan & CNRSCachan CedexFrance

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