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Abstract

Exploit kits have become a major cyber threat over the last few years. They are widely used in both massive and highly targeted cyber attack operations. The exploit kits make use of multiple exploits for major web browsers like Internet Explorer and popular browser plugins such as Adobe Flash and Reader. In this paper, a proactive approach to preventing this prevalent cyber threat from triggering their exploits is proposed. The suggested new technique called AFFAF proactively protects vulnerable systems using a fundamental characteristic of the exploit kits. Specifically, it utilises version information of web browsers and browser plugins. AFFAF is a zero-configuration solution, which means that users do not need to configure anything after installing it. In addition, it is an easy-to-employ methodology from the perspective of plugin developers. We have implemented a lightweight prototype and have shown that AFFAF enabled vulnerable systems can counteract 50 real-world and one locally deployed exploit kit URLs. Tested exploit kits include popular and well-maintained ones such as Blackhole 2.0, Redkit, Sakura, Cool and Bleeding Life 2. We have also demonstrated that the false positive rate of AFFAF is virtually zero, and it is robust enough to be effective against real web browser plugin scanners.

Keywords

Exploit kit Malware Web browser security 

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Copyright information

© Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Advanced Cyber Security Research Centre, Department of ComputingMacquarie UniversitySydneyAustralia

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