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Multipath TCP IDS Evasion and Mitigation

  • Zeeshan Afzal
  • Stefan Lindskog
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9290)

Abstract

The existing network security infrastructure is not ready for future protocols such as Multipath TCP (MPTCP). The outcome is that middleboxes are configured to block such protocols. This paper studies the security risk that arises if future protocols are used over unaware infrastructures. In particular, the practicality and severity of cross-path fragmentation attacks utilizing MPTCP against the signature-matching capability of the Snort intrusion detection system (IDS) is investigated. Results reveal that the attack is realistic and opens the possibility to evade any signature-based IDS. To mitigate the attack, a solution is also proposed in the form of the MPTCP Linker tool. The work outlines the importance of MPTCP support in future network security middleboxes.

Keywords

IDS evasion Multipath transfers TCP Snort Middleboxes 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The work was carried out in the High Quality Networked Services in a Mobile World (HITS) project, funded partly by the Knowledge Foundation of Sweden. The authors are grateful for the support provided by Catherine Pearce of Cisco.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlstad UniversityKarlstadSweden

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