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Autonomy, Interests, Justice and Active Medical Euthanasia

  • Julian SavulescuEmail author
Chapter
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 64)

Abstract

There are 4 main arguments for euthanasia: (1) arguments appealing to consistency (e.g., from passive to active euthanasia); (2) the argument from respect for autonomy; (3) appeals to justice; (4) the argument from interests (mercy or relief of suffering). I will argue that only the last is directly relevant to active euthanasia as a medical intervention, though arguments together from autonomy and justice can in practice (through the backdoor) provide a ground for voluntary active medical euthanasia (AME).

Keywords

Palliative Care Down Syndrome Distributive Justice Cochlear Implant Epidermolysis Bullosa 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of OxfordOxfordThe United Kingdom

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