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A Bidder-Oriented Privacy-Preserving VCG Auction Scheme

  • Maya Larson
  • Ruinian Li
  • Chunqiang Hu
  • Wei Li
  • Xiuzhen Cheng
  • Rongfang Bie
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9204)

Abstract

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items which has good economic properties. However, VCG has security vulnerabilities, e.g. it is vulnerable to auctioneer fraud. To make VCG more practical, bid prices must be well protected. To tackle this challenge, we propose a bidder-oriented, privacy-preserving auction scheme using homomorphic encryption, where the bidders can calculate the results by themselves, and the auctioneer is able to verify the results. Compared to previous research, our scheme is more trustworthy with stronger privacy.

Keywords

Privacy-preserving Homomorphic encryption VCG 

Notes

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank all the reviewers for their helpful comments. This project was supported by the US National Science Foundation (ECCS-1407986, AST-1443858, CNS-1265311, and CNS-1162057), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61171014).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceThe George Washington UniversityWashington, D.C.USA
  2. 2.College of Information Science and TechnologyBeijing Normal UniversityBeijingChina

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