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A Faster and More Realistic Flush+Reload Attack on AES

  • Berk Gülmezoğlu
  • Mehmet Sinan İnci
  • Gorka Irazoqui
  • Thomas Eisenbarth
  • Berk Sunar
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9064)

Abstract

Cloud’s unrivaled cost effectiveness and on the fly operation versatility is attractive to enterprise and personal users. However, the cloud inherits a dangerous behavior from virtualization systems that poses a serious security risk: resource sharing. This work exploits a shared resource optimization technique called memory deduplication to mount a powerful known-ciphertext only cache side-channel attack on a popular OpenSSL implementation of AES. In contrast to the other cross-VM cache attacks, our attack does not require synchronization with the target server and is fully asynchronous, working in a more realistic scenario with much weaker assumption. Also, our attack succeeds in just 15 seconds working across cores in the cross-VM setting. Our results show that there is strong information leakage through cache in virtualized systems and the memory deduplication should be approached with caution.

Keywords

Asynchronouos cross-VM attack Memory deduplication Flush and reload Known ciphertext attack Cache attacks 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Science Foundation, under grant CNS-1318919.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Berk Gülmezoğlu
    • 1
  • Mehmet Sinan İnci
    • 1
  • Gorka Irazoqui
    • 1
  • Thomas Eisenbarth
    • 1
  • Berk Sunar
    • 1
  1. 1.Worcester Polytechnic InstituteWorcesterUSA

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