Computational Management Science pp 23-30 | Cite as
Integrating Consumption and Reserve Strategies for Large Consumers in Electricity Markets
Conference paper
Abstract
In this paper we present the development of a simulation model for large consumers to optimise their consumption and reserve offers in a security constrained electricity market. We utilise the New Zealand grid, which has security constrained generation and transmission which can influence marginal nodal pricing. To illustrate this influence we use a series of small optimal power flow models as well as illustrating how these may influence a large integrated consumer (who offers interruptible load). Our simulation model has been successful at determining periods during which a large consumer may reduce their consumption (demand response) in order to reduce the energy price. We expect this approach to be extensible to other markets although we note that information surrounding the underlying market structure will heavily influence the viability
Keywords
Energy Price Electricity Market Reserve Price Spot Price Optimal Power Flow
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