Towards a Cyber-Physical Resilience Framework for Smart Grids

  • Ivo Friedberg
  • Kieran McLaughlin
  • Paul Smith
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9122)


As modern power grids move towards becoming a smart grid, there is an increasing reliance on the data that is transmitted and processed by ICT systems. This reliance introduces new digital attack vectors. Many of the proposed approaches that aim to address this problem largely focus on applying well-known ICT security solutions. However, what is needed are approaches that meet the complex concerns of the smart grid as a cyber-physical system. Furthermore, to support the automatic control loops that exist in a power grid, similarly automatic security and resilience mechanisms are needed that rely on minimal operator intervention. The research proposed in this paper aims to develop a framework that ensures resilient smart grid operation in light of successful cyber-attacks.


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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Queen’s University BelfastBelfastUK
  2. 2.AIT Austrian Institute of TechnologyViennaAustria

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