Trade-Off Approaches for Leak Resistant Modular Arithmetic in RNS

  • Christophe NegreEmail author
  • Guilherme Perin
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9144)


On an embedded device, an implementation of cryptographic operation, like an RSA modular exponentiation [12], can be attacked by side channel analysis. In particular, recent improvements on horizontal power analysis [3, 10] render ineffective the usual counter-measures which randomize the data at the very beginning of the computations [2, 4]. To counteract horizontal analysis it is necessary to randomize the computations all along the exponentiation. The leak resistant arithmetic (LRA) proposed in [1] implements modular arithmetic in residue number system (RNS) and randomizes the computations by randomly changing the RNS bases. We propose in this paper a variant of the LRA in RNS: we propose to change only one or a few moduli of the RNS basis. This reduces the cost of the randomization and makes it possible to be executed at each loop of a modular exponentiation.


Leak resistant arithmetic Randomization Modular multiplication Residue number system RSA 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Team DALIUniversité de PerpignanPerpignanFrance
  2. 2.LIRMM, UMR 5506Université Montpellier 2 and CNRSMontpellierFrance
  3. 3.RiscureDelftThe Netherlands

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