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Dynamic Threshold Public-Key Encryption with Decryption Consistency from Static Assumptions

  • Yusuke Sakai
  • Keita Emura
  • Jacob C.N. Schuldt
  • Goichiro Hanaoka
  • Kazuo Ohta
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9144)

Abstract

Dynamic threshold public-key encryption (dynamic TPKE) is a natural extension of ordinary TPKE which allows decryption servers to join the system dynamically after the system is set up, and allows the sender to dynamically choose the authorized set and the decryption threshold at the time of encryption. Currently, the only known dynamic TPKE scheme is a scheme proposed by Delerablée and Pointcheval (CRYPTO 2008). This scheme is proven to provide message confidentiality under a \(q\)-type assumption, but to achieve decryption consistency, a random oracle extension is required.

In this paper we show conceptually simple methods for constructing dynamic TPKE schemes with decryption consistency from only static assumptions (e.g., the decisional linear assumption in bilinear groups) without relying on random oracles. Our first construction is a purely generic construction from public-key encryption with non-interactive opening (PKENO) formalized by Damgård et al. (CT-RSA 2008). However, this construction achieves a slightly weaker notion of decryption consistency compared to the random oracle extension of the Delerablée and Pointcheval scheme, which satisfies the notion defined by Boneh, Boyen and Halevi (CT-RSA 2005). Our second construction uses a specific PKENO scheme based on the decisional linear assumption in combination with the efficient zero-knowledge proofs by Groth and Sahai. In contrast to our first construction, our second construction achieves the stronger notion of decryption consistency defined by Boneh, Boyen and Halevi.

Keywords

Random Oracle Commitment Scheme Challenge Ciphertext Common Reference String Bilinear Group 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yusuke Sakai
    • 1
  • Keita Emura
    • 2
  • Jacob C.N. Schuldt
    • 1
  • Goichiro Hanaoka
    • 1
  • Kazuo Ohta
    • 3
  1. 1.National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)TsukubaJapan
  2. 2.National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT)KoganeiJapan
  3. 3.The University of Electro-CommunicationsChofuJapan

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