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Modelling Ciphersuite and Version Negotiation in the TLS Protocol

  • Benjamin DowlingEmail author
  • Douglas Stebila
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9144)

Abstract

Real-world cryptographic protocols such as the widely used Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol support many different combinations of cryptographic algorithms (called ciphersuites) and simultaneously support different versions. Recent advances in provable security have shown that most modern TLS ciphersuites are secure authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) protocols, but these analyses generally focus on single ciphersuites in isolation. In this paper we extend the ACCE model to cover protocols with many different sub-protocols, capturing both multiple ciphersuites and multiple versions, and define a security notion for secure negotiation of the optimal sub-protocol. We give a generic theorem that shows how secure negotiation follows, with some additional conditions, from the authentication property of secure ACCE protocols. Using this framework, we analyse the security of ciphersuite and three variants of version negotiation in TLS, including a recently proposed mechanism for detecting fallback attacks.

Keywords

Transport layer security (tls) Ciphersuite negotiation Version negotiation Downgrade attacks Cryptographic protocols 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Queensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia

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