Logics for Legal Dynamics
Legal dynamics is an important aspect of legal reasoning that inspired the area of belief revision. While formal models of belief revision have been thoroughly examined, the formalisation of legal dynamics has been mostly neglected. In this contribution we propose Temporal Defeasible Logic to model legal dynamics . We build such a logic in steps starting from basic defeasible logic , and we show how to use it to model different forms of modifications such as derogations, textual modifications, abrogation and annulment.
KeywordsNorm change Legal dynamics Defeasible logic Temporal reasoning Theory revision
NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program.
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