Need-to-Share and Non-diffusion Requirements Verification in Exchange Policies

  • Rémi DelmasEmail author
  • Thomas Polacsek
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9097)


Whether be it for Earth observation, risk management or even companies relations, more and more interconnected organizations form decentralized systems in which the exchange, in terms of diffusion or non-diffusion of information between agents, can have critical consequences. In this paper, we present a formal framework to specify information exchange policies for such kinds of systems and two specific requirements, the need-to-share and the non-diffusion requirements, as well as properties strongly related to them. Wiser from these formal definitions, we see how to reconcile these sometimes antagonist requirements in a same policy specification with information filtering operations. We also explain how we use state of the art theorem provers to perform automatic analysis of these policies.


Requirements engineering Information exchange policies Formal specification Formal verification 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ONERAToulouseFrance

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