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Measuring DANE TLSA Deployment

  • Liang Zhu
  • Duane Wessels
  • Allison Mankin
  • John Heidemann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9053)

Abstract

The DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities) framework uses DNSSEC to provide a source of trust, and with TLSA it can serve as a root of trust for TLS certificates. This serves to complement traditional certificate authentication methods, which is important given the risks inherent in trusting hundreds of organizations—risks already demonstrated with multiple compromises. The TLSA protocol was published in 2012, and this paper presents the first systematic study of its deployment. We studied TLSA usage, developing a tool that actively probes all signed zones in .com and .net for TLSA records. We find the TLSA use is early: in our latest measurement, of the 485k signed zones, we find only 997 TLSA names. We characterize how it is being used so far, and find that around 7–13 % of TLSA records are invalid. We find 33 % of TLSA responses are larger than 1500 Bytes and will very likely be fragmented.

Keywords

Domain Name System IPv6 Address Mail Server Transport Layer Security MITM Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liang Zhu
    • 1
  • Duane Wessels
    • 2
  • Allison Mankin
    • 2
  • John Heidemann
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Southern CaliforniaAngelesUS
  2. 2.Verisign LabsSan FranciscoUS

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