Privacy by Design: On the Conformance Between Protocols and Architectures
In systems design, we generally distinguish the architecture and the protocol levels. In the context of privacy by design, in the first case, we talk about privacy architectures, which define the privacy goals and the main features of the system at high level. In the latter case, we consider the underlying concrete protocols and privacy enhancing technologies that implement the architectures. In this paper, we address the question that whether a given protocol conforms to a privacy architecture and provide the answer based on formal methods. We propose a process algebra variant to define protocols and reason about privacy properties, as well as a mapping procedure from protocols to architectures that are defined in a high-level architecture language.
KeywordsEquational Theory Parallel Composition Message Authentication Code Process Algebra Extraction Rule
The authors would like to thank Daniel Le Métayer for his initial idea and valuable comments during this work. This work is partially funded by the European project PARIS/FP7-SEC-2012-1, the ANR project BIOPRIV, and the Inria Project Lab CAPPRIS.
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