High-Level Simulation for Multiple Fault Injection Evaluation

  • Maxime Puys
  • Lionel Rivière
  • Julien Bringer
  • Thanh-ha Le
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8872)


Faults injection attacks have become a hot topic in the domain of smartcards. This work exposes a source code-base simulation approach designed to evaluate the robustness of high-level secured implementations against single and multiple fault injections. In addition to an unprotected CRT-RSA implementation, we successfully attacked two countermeasures with the high-level simulation under the data fault model. We define a filtering criterion that operates on found attacks and we refine our simulation analysis accordingly. We introduce a broader fault model that consists in skipping C lines of code and exhibit benefits of such high-level fault model in term of simulation performance and attack coverage.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maxime Puys
    • 1
  • Lionel Rivière
    • 1
    • 2
  • Julien Bringer
    • 1
  • Thanh-ha Le
    • 1
  1. 1.SAFRAN MorphoParisFrance
  2. 2.Télécom ParistechParisFrance

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