Automatically Calculating Quantitative Integrity Measures for Imperative Programs

  • Tom ChothiaEmail author
  • Chris Novakovic
  • Rajiv Ranjan Singh
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8872)


This paper presents a framework for calculating measures of data integrity for programs in a small imperative language. We develop a Markov chain semantics for our language which calculates Clarkson and Schneider’s definitions of data contamination and suppression. These definitions are based on conditional mutual information and entropy; we present a result relating them to mutual information, which can be calculated by a number of existing tools. We extend a quantitative information flow tool (CH-IMP) to calculate these measures of integrity and demonstrate this tool with examples based on error correcting codes, the Dining Cryptographers protocol and the attempts by a number of banks to influence the Libor rate.


Mutual Information Probability Transition Matrix Secret Data Information Leakage Attack Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tom Chothia
    • 1
    Email author
  • Chris Novakovic
    • 1
  • Rajiv Ranjan Singh
    • 2
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science, Shyam Lal CollegeUniversity of DelhiNew DelhiIndia

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