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Balanced Encoding to Mitigate Power Analysis: A Case Study

  • Cong Chen
  • Thomas Eisenbarth
  • Aria Shahverdi
  • Xin Ye
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8968)

Abstract

Most side channel countermeasures for software implementations of cryptography either rely on masking or randomize the execution order of the cryptographic implementation. This work proposes a countermeasure that has constant leakage in common linear leakage models. Constant leakage is achieved not only for internal state values, but also for their transitions. The proposed countermeasure provides perfect protection in the theoretical leakage model. To study the practical relevance of the proposed countermeasure, it is applied to a software implementation of the block cipher Prince. This case study allows us to give realistic values for resulting implementation overheads as well as for the resulting side channel protection levels that can be achieved in realistic implementation scenarios.

Keywords

Mutual Information Block Cipher Side Channel Side Channel Attack Leakage Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. #1261399 and Grant No. #1314770. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Cong Chen
    • 1
  • Thomas Eisenbarth
    • 1
  • Aria Shahverdi
    • 1
  • Xin Ye
    • 1
  1. 1.Worcester Polytechnic InstituteWorcesterUSA

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