On the Security of Fresh Re-keying to Counteract Side-Channel and Fault Attacks

  • Christoph DobraunigEmail author
  • Maria Eichlseder
  • Stefan Mangard
  • Florian Mendel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8968)


At AFRICACRYPT 2010 and CARDIS 2011, fresh re-keying schemes to counter side-channel and fault attacks were introduced. The idea behind those schemes is to shift the main burden of side-channel protection to a re-keying function \(g\) that is easier to protect than the main block cipher. This function produces new session keys based on the secret master key and random nonces for every block of message that is encrypted. In this paper, we present a generic chosen-plaintext key-recovery attack on both fresh re-keying schemes. The attack is based on two observations: Since session key collisions for the same message are easy to detect, it is possible to recover one session key with a simple time-memory trade-off strategy; and if the re-keying function is easy to invert (such as the suggested multiplication constructions), the attacker can use the session key to recover the master key. The attack has a complexity of about \(2 \cdot 2^{n/2}\) (instead of the expected \(2^n\)) for an \(n\)-bit key. For the typically employed block cipher AES-128, this would result in a key-recovery attack complexity of only \(2^{65}\). If weaker primitives like 80-bit PRESENT are used, even lower attack complexities are possible.


Side-channel attacks Fresh re-keying Key-recovery attack 



This work has been supported in part by the Austrian Science Fund (project P26494-N15) and by the Austrian Government through the research program ICT of the Future under the project number 4593209 (project SCALAS).


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoph Dobraunig
    • 1
    Email author
  • Maria Eichlseder
    • 1
  • Stefan Mangard
    • 1
  • Florian Mendel
    • 1
  1. 1.IAIKGraz University of TechnologyGrazAustria

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