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Bounded, yet Sufficient? How to Determine Whether Limited Side Channel Information Enables Key Recovery

  • Xin Ye
  • Thomas Eisenbarth
  • William Martin
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8968)

Abstract

This work presents a novel algorithm to quantify the relation between three factors that characterize a side channel adversary: the amount of observed side channel leakage, the workload of full key recovery, and its achievable success rate. The proposed algorithm can be used by security evaluators to derive a realistic bound on the capabilities of a side channel adversary. Furthermore, it provides an optimal strategy for combining subkey guesses to achieve any predefined success rate. Hence, it can be used by a side channel adversary to determine whether observed leakage suffices for key recovery before expending computation time. The algorithm is applied to a series of side channel measurements of a microcontroller AES implementation and simulations. A comparison to related work shows that the new algorithm improves on existing algorithms in several respects.

Keywords

Side channel analysis Security evaluation Guesswork Full key recovery Weak maximum likelihood 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. #1261399 and Grant No. #1314770. We would like to thank François-Xavier Standaert for the helpful discussion. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Worcester Polytechnic InstituteWorcesterUSA

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