Primordial Givenness in Husserl and Heidegger

  • Panos Theodorou
Chapter
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 83)

Abstract

In his Ideas I (1913), with his thought experiment of world-annihilation, Husserl becomes persuaded that the beings of which we are conscious do not simply lie ‘out there’ in themselves, enjoying an independent (realistic) existence. Our experience of beings in a world, qua total horizon of beings, is the achievement of our intentional consciousness, which unfolds its overall constitutive possibilities. It is because of this that in our everyday meaningful comportments, we are always intentionally correlated with what is “Vorhanden” for us.

It is generally thought that Husserl was of the view that, for us, primordial consciousness is the perceptual experience of nature-things; simple sensory perceptual things. That is, on the lowest level of our conscious life, we are intentionally correlated with simple perceptually appearing things. Our experience of cultural beings or, more broadly speaking, things of value (goods) like tools, books, etc., is intentionally derivative and founded upon the former.

Keywords

Cultural Layer Intentional Object Cultural Object Intentional Correlate Intentional Consciousness 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Panos Theodorou
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy & Social StudiesUniversity of CreteRethymnoGreece

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