Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense: Building the Scientific Foundation

  • George Cybenko
  • Sushil Jajodia
  • Michael P. Wellman
  • Peng Liu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8880)


Today’s cyber defenses are largely static. They are governed by slow deliberative processes involving testing, security patch deployment, and human-in-the-loop monitoring. As a result, adversaries can systematically probe target networks, pre-plan their attacks, and ultimately persist for long times inside compromised networks and hosts. A new class of technologies, called Adaptive Cyber Defense (ACD), is being developed that presents adversaries with optimally changing attack surfaces and system configurations, forcing adversaries to continually re-assess and re-plan their cyber operations. Although these approaches (e.g., moving target defense, dynamic diversity, and bio-inspired defense) are promising, they assume stationary and stochastic, but non-adversarial, environments. To realize the full potential, we need to build the scientific foundations so that system resiliency and robustness in adversarial settings can be rigorously defined, quantified, measured, and extrapolated in a rigorous and reliable manner.


Adaptation Technique Reinforcement Learning Algorithm Homogeneous Functionality Memory Layout Uncertain Reasoning 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Cybenko
    • 1
  • Sushil Jajodia
    • 2
  • Michael P. Wellman
    • 3
  • Peng Liu
    • 4
  1. 1.Thayer School of EngineeringDartmouth CollegeHanoverGermany
  2. 2.Center for Secure Information SystemsGeorge Mason UniversityFairfax
  3. 3.Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceUniversity of MichiganAnn ArborUSA
  4. 4.College of Information Sciences and TechnologyPennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA

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