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Compliance Validation of Secure Service Compositions

  • Achim D. Brucker
  • Luca Compagna
  • Pierre Guilleminot
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8900)

Abstract

The Aniketos Secure Composition Framework supports the specification of secure and trustworthy composition plans in term of BPMN. The diversity of security and trust properties that is supported by the Aniketos framework allows, on the one hand, for expressing a large number of security and compliance requirements. On the other hand, the resulting expressiveness results in the risk that high-level compliance requirements (e.g., separation of duty) are not implemented by low-level security means (e.g., role-based access control configurations).

In this chapter, we present the Composition Security Validation Module (CSVM). The CSVM provides a service for checking the compliance of secure and trustworthy composition plans to the service designer. As proof-of-concept we created a prototype in which the CSVM module is deployed on the SAP NetWeaver Cloud and two CSVM Connectors are built supporting two well-known BPMN tools: SAP NetWeaver BPM and Activiti Designer.

Keywords

Validation Security BPMN SecureBPMN Compliance 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Achim D. Brucker
    • 1
  • Luca Compagna
    • 2
  • Pierre Guilleminot
    • 2
  1. 1.SAP SEKarlsruheGermany
  2. 2.SAP SESophia-AntipolisFrance

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