Malleability Resilient Concealed Data Aggregation

  • Keyur ParmarEmail author
  • Devesh C. JinwalaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8846)


Concealed data aggregation protects against passive attackers and ensures privacy of sensor readings at intermediate nodes. However, the use of inherently malleable privacy homomorphism makes it susceptible to active attackers. In addition, it is a well-known fact that encrypted data processing is vulnerable to pollution attacks where a single malicious node can flood the network by fake readings. Hence, there exists a need to authenticate the processed readings. Traditional authentication mechanisms are not viable due to the conflicting requirements like in-network processing and encrypted data processing. The need for en route aggregation of sensor readings, the need for encrypted data processing and the need for message authentication both at the base station and at aggregator nodes, make message authentication a formidable challenge. Homomorphic Message Authentication Codes (H-MACs) help to verify the integrity of processed sensor readings. However, the need to verify the integrity of sensor readings both at intermediate node(s) and at the base station cannot be realized simultaneously through the currently available techniques. In this paper, we combine the benefits of privacy homomorphism and H-MACs to provide malleability resilient concealed data aggregation in the presence of both insider and outsider adversaries. As per our knowledge, our solution is the first to achieve integrity protecting concealed data aggregation in the presence of both insider and outsider adversaries.


Wireless sensor networks Concealed data aggregation Privacy homomorphism Homomorphic MAC Malleability resilience 



This research was a part of a project “A Secure Data Aggregation System and An Intrusion Detection System for Wireless Sensor Networks”. It was supported by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.S. V. National Institute of TechnologySuratIndia

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