Judgment Aggregation with Abstentions under Voters’ Hierarchy

  • Guifei Jiang
  • Dongmo Zhang
  • Laurent Perrussel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8861)


Similar to Arrow’s impossibility theorem for preference aggregation, judgment aggregation has also an intrinsic impossibility for generating consistent group judgment from individual judgments. Removing some of the pre-assumed conditions would mitigate the problem but may still lead to too restrictive solutions. It was proved that if completeness is removed but other plausible conditions are kept, the only possible aggregation functions are oligarchic, which means that the group judgment is purely determined by a certain subset of participating judges. Instead of further challenging the other conditions, this paper investigates how the judgment from each individual judge affects the group judgment in an oligarchic environment. We explore a set of intuitively demanded conditions under abstentions and design a feasible judgment aggregation rule based on the agents’ hierarchy. We show this proposed aggregation rule satisfies the desirable conditions. More importantly, this rule is oligarchic with respect to a subset of agenda instead of the whole agenda due to its literal-based characteristics.


Social Choice Aggregation Function Aggregation Rule Collective Rationality Propositional Variable 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guifei Jiang
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dongmo Zhang
    • 1
  • Laurent Perrussel
    • 2
  1. 1.AIRG, University of Western SydneyAustralia
  2. 2.IRIT, University of ToulouseFrance

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