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Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games

  • Vittorio Bilò
  • Angelo Fanelli
  • Michele Flammini
  • Gianpiero Monaco
  • Luca Moscardelli
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8877)

Abstract

Cluster formation games are games in which self-organized groups (or clusters) are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent and selfish players. We consider fractional hedonic games, that is, cluster formation games in which the happiness of each player in a group is the average value she ascribes to its members. We adopt Nash stable outcomes, where no player can improve her utility by unilaterally changing her own group, as the target solution concept and study their existence, complexity and performance for games played on general and specific graph topologies.

Keywords

Social Welfare Coalition Structure Graph Topology Social Optimum Optimal Cluster 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vittorio Bilò
    • 1
  • Angelo Fanelli
    • 2
  • Michele Flammini
    • 3
    • 4
  • Gianpiero Monaco
    • 3
  • Luca Moscardelli
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and PhysicsUniversity of SalentoItaly
  2. 2.CNRS, (UMR-6211)France
  3. 3.DISIMUniversity of L’AquilaItaly
  4. 4.Gran Sasso Science InstituteL’AquilaItaly
  5. 5.Department of Economic StudiesUniversity of Chieti-PescaraItaly

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