Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions

  • Max Klimm
  • Andreas Schütz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8877)


We introduce a generalization of weighted congestion games in which players are associated with k-dimensional demand vectors and resource costs are k-dimensional functions \(\smash{c : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^k \to \mathbb{R}}\) of the aggregated demand vector of the players using the resource. Such a cost structure is natural when the cost of a resource depends on different properties of the players’ demands, e.g., total weight, total volume, and total number of items. A complete characterization of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in terms of the resource cost functions for all k ∈ ℕ is given.


Cost Function Nash Equilibrium Complete Characterization Strategy Space Congestion Game 
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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Max Klimm
    • 1
  • Andreas Schütz
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für MathematikTechnische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany

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