Chapter 5 On Virtues
In this chapter, Solov’ëv develops his thesis that each of the moral foundations—shame, pity and religious feeling—can be examined from three sides: as a virtue, as a rule of action, and as the condition of a certain good. A virtuous person is a person as he or she ought to be. In other words, virtue is the normal, or proper, relation of a person to everything. There are three fundamental virtues in the proper sense, fundamentally expressing a definite and defining quality. All the other so-called virtues are only qualities of the will and forms of action having in themselves no moral determination or constant correlation with the known sphere of what ought to be and therefore may sometimes be virtues, sometimes states of indifference and also sometimes vices. Solov’ëv develops this claim in detail with respect to truthfulness, particularly in contrast to Kant’s position.