FlipThem: Modeling Targeted Attacks with FlipIt for Multiple Resources

  • Aron Laszka
  • Gabor Horvath
  • Mark Felegyhazi
  • Levente Buttyán
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8840)

Abstract

Recent high-profile targeted attacks showed that even the most secure and secluded networks can be compromised by motivated and resourceful attackers, and that such a system compromise may not be immediately detected by the system owner. Researchers at RSA proposed the FlipIt game to study the impact of such stealthy takeovers. In the basic FlipIt game, an attacker and a defender fight over a single resource; in practice, however, systems typically consist of multiple resources that can be targeted. In this paper, we present FlipThem, a generalization of FlipIt to multiple resources. To formulate the players’ goals and study their best strategies, we introduce two control models: in the AND model, the attacker has to compromise all resources in order to take over the entire system, while in the OR model, she has to compromise only one. Our analytical and numerical results provide practical recommendations for defenders.

Keywords

FlipIt game theory advanced persistent threats targeted attacks attacker-defender games 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aron Laszka
    • 1
  • Gabor Horvath
    • 2
  • Mark Felegyhazi
    • 2
  • Levente Buttyán
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for Software Integrated Systems (ISIS)Vanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of Networked Systems and Services (HIT)Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME)BudapestHungary

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