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On the Reliability of Network Measurement Techniques Used for Malware Traffic Analysis

  • Joseph Gardiner
  • Shishir Nagaraja
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8809)

Abstract

Malware attacks are increasingly popular attack vectors in online crime. As trends and anecdotal evidence show, preventing these attacks, regardless of their opportunistic or targeted nature, has proven difficult: intrusions happen and devices get compromised, even at security-conscious organisations. As a consequence, an alternative line of work has focused on detecting and disrupting the individual steps that follow an initial compromise and that are essential for the successful progression of the attack. In particular, a number of approaches and techniques have been proposed to identify the Command & Control (C2) channel that a compromised system establishes to communicate with its controller. The success of C2 detection approaches depends on collecting relevant network traffic. As traffic volumes increase this is proving increasingly difficult. In this paper, we analyse current approaches of ISP-scale network measurement from the perspective of C2 detection. We discuss a number of weaknesses that affect current techniques and provide suggestions for their improvement.

Keywords

Uniform Sampling Proportional Fairness Flow Size Flooding Attack Traffic Trace 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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