A New Approach to Secrecy Amplification in Partially Compromised Networks (Invited Paper)

  • Radim Ošťádal
  • Petr Švenda
  • Václav Matyáš
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8804)


Usage of various key (pre-)distribution schemes (KDSs) in networks with an active attacker results in a partially compromised network where some fraction of keys used to protect link communication is known to the attacker. The secrecy amplification protocols were proposed to secure again some previously compromised communication links by using non-compromised paths to deliver new secure keys. Design of suitable secrecy amplification protocols remains a challenge in scenarios where a trade-off between necessary resources (e.g., energy necessary for transmission of message) and improvement in the number of secure links must be balanced. We inspect classes of secrecy amplification protocols known as node-oriented and group-oriented protocols proposed for use in wireless sensor networks (WSN).

We combine analysis of given protocol participant placement via a simulator and manual post-processing to provide a simpler, practically usable hybrid protocol with less steps and lower communication overhead, yet still better in terms of re-secured links than previously proposed protocols.


Evolutionary algorithms key establishment secrecy amplification protocols wireless sensor networks 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Radim Ošťádal
    • 1
  • Petr Švenda
    • 2
  • Václav Matyáš
    • 2
  1. 1.Government CERTCzech Republic
  2. 2.Masaryk UniversityBrnoCzech Republic

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