TAuth: Verifying Timed Security Protocols

  • Li Li
  • Jun Sun
  • Yang Liu
  • Jin Song Dong
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8829)


Quantitative timing is often relevant to the security of systems, like web applications, cyber-physical systems, etc. Verifying timed security protocols is however challenging as both arbitrary attacking behaviors and quantitative timing may lead to undecidability. In this work, we develop a service framework to support intuitive modeling of the timed protocol, as well as automatic verification with an unbounded number of sessions. The partial soundness and completeness of our verification algorithms are formally defined and proved. We implement our method into a tool called TAuth and the experiment results show that our approach is efficient and effective in both finding security flaws and giving proofs.


False Alarm Timing Constraint Service Composition Service Basis Authentication Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Li Li
    • 1
  • Jun Sun
    • 2
  • Yang Liu
    • 3
  • Jin Song Dong
    • 1
  1. 1.National University of SingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.Singapore University of Technology and DesignSingapore
  3. 3.Nanyang Technological UniversitySingapore

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