Why Do We Need Responsive Regulation and Behavioural Research in EU Internal Market Law?

Part of the Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship book series (EALELS, volume 2)


Due to its intrinsic need to establish an internal market even against the nation states’ will, EU law has always had to rely on the responsiveness of its peoples in order to make the establishment of the internal market a success. As to this need, top-down macro-economic regulation without a social bottom-up backup by the peoples of Europe has mostly failed. This creates a “legitimacy market failure” of the EU internal market, which needs to be cured by responsive regulation. Data gained from behavioural research are the right tools to cure such a market failure in EU internal market law. The provision of hard data from behavioural research is the most promising way to do so as it leaves room for Member States to behave opportunistically only if they present more convincing data. By combining responsive regulation and behavioural economics, the EU is able to first listen to its people and second incentivize Member States to act in the best interest for its peoples and the internal market.


Internal Market Market Failure Efficient Market Hypothesis Responsive Regulation Governance Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



I would like to thank Hans Micklitz, Jeff Rachlinski, Harm Schepel, Anne-Lise Sibony, and Avishalom Tor for valuable comments on an earlier version of this piece.


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law and Governance GroupUniversity of WageningenWageningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Law SchoolErasmus UniversityRotterdamThe Netherlands

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