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Origins and Consequences of State-Level Variation in Shale Regulation: The Cases of Pennsylvania and New York

  • Ilia MurtazashviliEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 45)

Abstract

The combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling unlocked the economic potential of shale gas in the United States. However, the regulatory response to shale gas has varied substantially. This chapter considers the political economy of Marcellus Shale, focusing on differences in regulatory responses in Pennsylvania and New York. It suggests that the regulatory response in Pennsylvania is “efficient” and that different responses can be explained by features of politics, rather than geography, relative prices, or institutions. The chapter concludes by considering the benefits and costs of federal regulation of fracking. Although states have varied substantially in their response to fracking, decentralized governance of shale gas has many benefits and few discernible costs.

Keywords

Local Government Institutional Change Relative Prex Mineral Land Resource Curse 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Public and International AffairsUniversity of PittsburghPittsburghUSA

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