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You Can’t Be Me: Enabling Trusted Paths and User Sub-origins in Web Browsers

  • Enrico Budianto
  • Yaoqi Jia
  • Xinshu Dong
  • Prateek Saxena
  • Zhenkai Liang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8688)

Abstract

Once a web application authenticates a user, it loosely associates all resources owned by the user to the web session established. Consequently, any scripts injected into the victim web session attain unfettered access to user-owned resources, including scripts that commit malicious activities inside a web application. In this paper, we establish the first explicit notion of user sub-origins to defeat such attempts. Based on this notion, we propose a new solution called UserPath to establish an end-to-end trusted path between web application users and web servers. To evaluate our solution, we implement a prototype in Chromium, and retrofit it to 20 popular web applications. UserPath reduces the size of client-side TCB that has access to user-owned resources by 8x to 264x, with small developer effort.

Keywords

User sub-origins trusted path script injection attacks 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enrico Budianto
    • 1
  • Yaoqi Jia
    • 1
  • Xinshu Dong
    • 2
  • Prateek Saxena
    • 1
  • Zhenkai Liang
    • 1
  1. 1.National University of SingaporeSingapore
  2. 2.Advanced Digital Sciences CenterSingapore

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